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Summary
For four decades after World War II (between 1947 and the end of the 1980s), a 
Soviet-type planned economy introduced under external pressure prevailed in Hun-
gary. When this line weakened, the then “trendy” neoliberal market economy system 
gained ground. Although the Hungarian planned economy was characterized by a 
practice saturated with market elements, intended to increase the financial interests 
of domestic residents, still control by external fundamentals, deregulation and chop-
ping government functions became the general market practice. However, neither 
the planned economy modelled on the Soviet system, nor the neoliberal market econ-
omy model built on the principles of the Washington Consensus suit the Hungarian 
conditions. The Crisis of the neoliberal model had become obvious by the end of the 
2000s. In contrast to this, however, after 2010, a proactive economy influencing state 
model came to the forefront during the practice of recovery from the crisis. 
Recalling the historical events preceding the changes, following the new inter-
national trends after 2007–2008, and the successes achieved using unconventional 
instruments after the 2010 government change, all give a reason for the existence of 
Hungarian public finance reforms. With institutional thinking coming to the lime-
light and by demonstration of the new type of instruments, the author scientifically 
justifies the unconventional methods used in Hungarian public finances. In the au-
thor’s opinion, after the 2007–2008 crisis, all over the world evidences suggest an 
increasing shift in thinking towards the institutional framework and the need of state 
influence, control and regulation of the economy. There is a strong demand for ad-
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dressing informational asymmetries, increasing government control and improving 
the conditions of competition by means available for governments. This analysis pro-
vides a scientific outline of this taxonomy. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) code: A2, B1, E12, E5, G01, H6, N10, P10, P20
Keywords: political economy, fiscal policy, monetary policy, planned economy, sub-
prime crisis, new public finances system
Increasing institutional thinking –  
A historical and international outlook
Although nearly all the most prominent personalities in the more than two hundred 
years history of economics were engaged in public finance issues, the approach that 
consciously endeavoured to integrate economic developments into the social and po-
litical reality only appeared about a century ago. In our days, thinking in terms of 
institutions is especially topical, as the crisis that erupted in 2007–2008 proves that the 
market must not be left alone and economic issues should not be construed without 
their consequences taken in the broad sense.
According to Ronald Coase (1937:386–405; 1991), an economist awarded the No-
bel Prize in 1991, for a long time economics neglected institutional questions and was 
only engaged in completing and formalizing the ideals of Adam Smith’s 1776 Wealth of 
Nations, a book that undoubtedly triggered revolutionary changes (Smith, 1776). All 
this means that economists paid insufficient attention to the developments within an 
organization or a company – this was the subject matter of Coase’s research – and to 
the social and political environment and context of economic decisions.
Institutions matter – this was succinctly worded by Douglass North, Nobel Prize 
winner of 1993 (North, 1993; 1994:381–391). Following the traditions of Thorstein 
Veblen (1899), Walton Hamilton (1919:309–318) and John R. Commons (1936:237–
249), this school of economics defines institutions as any factor that has an impact on 
economic decisions: formal rules, i.e. laws and other government regulations, and 
informal factors, i.e. culture and even the religious background. Nowadays it is dif-
ficult to believe, but for a long time economists were nearly divorced from everyday 
reality and failed to consider that in different legal and cultural settings people react 
differently to the individual economic policy and public finance developments and 
decisions. Hungary’s experiences of the past two decades show the significance of this 
topic, as the recipes borrowed from more developed market economies and countries 
that have been learning democracy for a longer period did not fit the Hungarian fea-
tures and frequently failed in Hungary.
As the ideas of John Maynard Keynes gained ground in the 1930s, the institutional 
approach, which emphasized the significance of rules and standards, was pushed to 
the background (Keynes, 1936). A few decades later, during the 1980s and 1990s, in-
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stitutionalists, including the above-mentioned Coase and North, the 2009 Noble Prize 
winner Oliver Williamson, once again made their way to the mainstream economic 
thinking (Williamson, 2000:595–613). Nevertheless, their theoretically underpinned 
ideas were less fed through to practice, apparently, this was delayed until the 2007–
2008 crisis. The efforts at breaking the preponderance of schools celebrating market 
mechanisms proved to be futile for a long time, and a series of economic collapses were 
required to make the world realize that a self-remedying market, unlimited reason, 
or public finances operating without regulation are non-existent. 
Undoubtedly, economic policy and public finances must also place special empha-
sis on the costs of economic and financial transactions and on the fact that one of the 
high-priority duties of economic management is to cut these costs. This means that 
institutions, rules and law must be adopted to reduce transaction costs. If we accept 
that these costs typically arise from uncertainty and risks, then one of the purposes of 
a state is to create a background that keeps such market uncertainties in check and 
moderates them. For this reason, one of the main paths of institutional thinking is the 
research of the regulatory matrix required for the creation of a smoothly functioning 
economy and state. According to the classification given by Harvard professor Dani 
Rodrik, there are four distinguishable institutional groups that are indispensable for 
economic and social development (Rodrik, 2000; 2003).
– Economic development is inconceivable without the institutions that guaran-
tee the protection of ownership rights (market-creating institutions), as protection and 
guarantee for the given type of ownership rights are the prerequisites of development.
– Market regulating institutions: even classical economics admits that there are mar-
ket failures that need to be addressed – they include externalities, imperfect informa-
tion and the restrictive consequences of the economies of scale.
– Market stabilizing institutions: all institutions aimed at ensuring a stable economic 
environment, including price stability, the minimization of macro-economic volatility, 
or the aversion of financial crises (central banks, exchange rate regimes, and fiscal 
and monetary rules).
– Market legitimizing institutions: It is insufficient to prove the superiority of the mar-
ket economy in schoolbooks and journals, the society should be persuaded to accept 
the institutions that address market fluctuations and negative outcomes, hammer and 
protect social trust (social security and unemployment insurance schemes, welfare 
benefits, pension funds, and the public finance system).
One of the important areas of the institutional approach to the public finance 
system is central bank regulation, which was among the first areas to be reshuffled as 
a result of the crisis. In Rodrik’s model, the central bank is seen as one of the most im-
portant stabilizing institutions in the economy. According to this classical approach, 
this serves price stability, however, after the events of the 2007–2008 crisis, the central 
banks’ responsibility for general macro-economic stability and perhaps even social sta-
bility is also being raised. The financial crisis put an end to the previously created con-
sensus on monetary policy. The redistribution effects of monetary policy came to the 
forefront again, and the modelling of central bank decisions and their transparency 
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inevitably required the creation of a conceptual framework that allows the complex 
interpretation of monetary policy decisions in a social context.
In the 20 to 30 years preceding the crisis, reflections about the central bank policy 
were rather single-minded. In their studies, Barro and Gordon, on the one hand (Bar-
ro–Gordon, 1983:589–610), and Kydland and Prescott, on the other, determined the 
basic frame of mind in relation to central banks’ independence (Kydland–Prescott, 
1977:473–492). More complex approaches more susceptible to realities were put on 
hold till today, despite the fact that already back in 1983 John Woolley set up a typology 
of the factors having their effects felt through the government and those beyond the 
government, as well as the structural and the less embedded factors that may influence 
central banks’ decisions (Woolley, 1983). The 1998 Russian crisis was an additional 
warning sign. This was the very first caution that called attention to the insufficiency 
of the means available for regulatory and supervisory regimes, which acted against the 
efficient and safe operation of the financial system over the long term. This is because 
in the course of the deregulation that lasted for nearly forty years before the collapse of 
the Russian stock exchange, guaranteed legal institutions disappeared from the finan-
cial and capital market regulation (Kecskés, 2016:333–356). Experiences in monetary 
policy and the related research may be useful, among other reasons, because they shed 
light on the thorough changes that may follow in the next few decades in relation to 
the totality of public finances on a theoretical and practical level.
Fundamentals of fiscal and monetary policy after 2010 
Before the crisis it was generally accepted that central banks must operate in the “one 
objective – one instrument” framework, and in the European continental space this 
meant that the only factor they were required to take into account was inflation, and 
if they intervened to adjust inflationary developments, they do it through short-term 
interests.2 This “one objective, one instrument” principle is a classical operational 
scheme for central banks. However, the crisis superseded this paradigm (Blanchard 
et al., 2012:174), and currently central banks apply a great variety of instruments3 and 
in addition to their primary aim, they also focus on other goals like financial stability, 
boosting lending and support to the government’s economic policy.
According to the consensus made after the crisis, price stability is required for 
sustainable, long-term growth in the economy, however, this condition is insufficient; 
what is more, the central bank should use the instruments to achieve macro-economic 
stability. Thus the central banking practice has developed in the direction of facilitat-
ing economic policy objectives in the broader sense, keeping the price stability objec-
tive as a priority. The arguments “limiting” the requirements of central banking op-
eration, prevalent before the crisis (Kydland–Prescott, 1977), seem to be losing force, 
their enforceability is declining, while the elaboration of post-crisis theories providing 
a scientific basis for “optimal” central banking operation is in progress.4
In contrast to the conventional approach, the two most important branches of eco-
nomic policy5 include a budget policy underpinned by a god tax system, and a monetary 
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policy having complex economic objectives and placed in a social context. This means 
that in an institutional perspective, the public finance regime is built on fiscal and mon-
etary policies. The long-term sustainability of fiscal policy has a substantial impact on 
any particular country’s sovereign risk assessment, and indirectly, the elbowroom of 
monetary policy. A low deficit improves a country’s investment rating. Fiscal policy may 
also influence monetary policy decisions through consumer prices – indirect taxes and 
regulatory prices. Fiscal policy is one of the fundamental means of economic govern-
ment and the method of influencing the economy by budgetary means. The incomes 
generated in the economy are centralized and redistributed by means of this policy. 
Thus, in addition to generating tax revenues for the income side of the government’s 
account, absorbing the redistributive function of the state, it finances the social sector, 
public administration and public services, and supports families that undertake to raise 
children, households and businesses struggling with income disparity, and entrepre-
neurs who especially fit into the government’s objectives. Indirectly, it determines the 
amount of income the income owners are allowed to retain and the additional income 
deprived person can have access to, and raises the amount of funds required for the 
tertiary sector of the state. It ensures the payment of interest on government loans. 
Its long-term purposes include promoting the financial advancement of the national 
economy, businesses and families through the creation of optimum income positions. 
Fiscal policy is the sovereign means used for centralization and redistribution processes, 
with the government’s political priorities and public finance policy principles in respect 
of the economy and society manifest in its technique, extent and character. Fiscal policy 
is necessary to serve the sustainability of the national economy’s operation through the 
centralization, redistribution and regulation of financial processes (beyond the budget-
ary sector), and monetary policy is required to provide assistance to this function using 
its facilitating mechanisms (without interfering with its independence). 
The most important means of fiscal policy is taxation, and in the case of a crisis, 
based on Keynes’ model, the generation of additional demand moderates oversup-
ply and then gets economic growth moving. In a crisis mode, fiscal policy primarily 
endeavours to increase taxation efficiency, quell black economy, and increase the vol-
ume of taxes collected. 
Monetary policy, and its institution, the central bank, is the other significant 
branch of public finance policy. It had been involved in the refinancing of the real 
sector up to the mid-1990s and in financing the sovereign debt up to the turn of 
the millennium – with decreasing activity in Hungary.6 It gradually withdrew from 
these classical roles during the fulfilment of its obligations regarding accession to the 
European Union. However, the central bank’s refinancing functions was performed 
without due circumspection, and on numerous occasions, financial disadvantage was 
caused.7 Fast withdrawal of the central bank from refinancing, almost without tran-
sition, was unjustified by the current level of the Hungarian economy and society, 
which would actually require an expansion in refinancing, particularly in order to 
strengthen Hungarian businesses and agricultural producers. The same can be said 
of the central bank’s withdrawal from financing government debt. 
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The sovereign debt and the budget deficit did not decrease with the central bank’s 
withdrawal from financing. Rather the reverse: financing them from the free market 
is more expensive, and withdraws funds from the social and economy development 
chapters of the budget. Moreover, significant financial risk is also involved, as in the 
past decades Hungary’s sovereign debt was financed, for the most part, from abroad, 
ab ovo making the national economy vulnerable. Budgetary expenses did not de-
crease and did not become more sensitive as a result of channelling deficit financing 
to market funds. Deficit generation was due to system failures, and the method of 
its financing had no impact on it. Budgetary expenses exceeded budget revenues as 
a result of the crisis of state-owned companies after the change of regime, the weak 
capitalization and low tax payment capacity of start-up SMEs, and the tax benefits 
and exemptions granted to international companies. On the side of governmental 
expenditures, the budget8 was required to support the citizens who dropped out of 
the social divisions of labour and sank into debt in increasing numbers, and to finance 
the reorganization and consolidation of businesses and local councils that became 
inoperable.9  
The exchange rate regime is selected by the government in agreement with the 
National Bank of Hungary. Since 26 February 2008, the exchange rate of the forint 
to the euro as a benchmark currency has been freely floating, and forint fluctuations 
are determined by market forces. The expansion of lending in forints after the turn 
of the millennium, and in foreign currency after 2002, mainly to households, and 
especially to dubious debtors, caused serious financial instability in both the house-
hold and the local council sector as a result of the 2008 exchange rate explosion, risk 
premium increase, job losses and income reduction. Due to the debt spiral, the previ-
ous managements of the National Bank of Hungary faced heavy social criticism. The 
household sector’s foreign currency loan debts were consolidated initially by the new 
government, and then after 2013, by the central bank, and thus the financial uncer-
tainty pressing the country was reduced.10 
Article 41 of the Fundamental Act stipulates that the National Bank of Hungary 
is the central bank of Hungary responsible for monetary policy in the manner speci-
fied in a separate cardinal act (the Central Bank Act of 2011 and then of 2013). The 
primary objective of the MNB is to achieve and maintain price stability. Without preju-
dice to its primary objective, it supports the economic policy of the government, using 
the monetary policy instruments at its disposal. In terms of content, the Hungarian 
central bank’s activity serves public good. This means that the statutory mandates are 
ultimately enforced in the interest of social and economic benefits to the public. The 
three objectives of the central bank include the moderation of inflation, boosting 
economic growth and maintaining financial equilibrium. It affects three areas: the 
general government, businesses and households. The central bank’s operation has its 
effects felt at a macro- and micro-economic level and in a social context.11 The central 
bank has become part of the public finance system. 
The National Bank of Hungary is a member of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). The MNB and the members of its decision-making bodies are inde-
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pendent in carrying out the tasks and meeting their obligations conferred upon them 
by law, and may not seek or take instructions from the Government, the institutions 
and bodies of the European Union, the governments of its Member States and any 
other bodies, other than the European Central Bank. The mechanism that supports 
fiscal policy evolves from the central bank’s on deliberation and responsible conduct 
pursued in the interest of the national economy, implemented without jeopardizing 
the primary objectives related to the maintenance of price stability. 
In 2013, Parliament adopted a new act on the central bank, while the guarantees 
for the central bank’s independence were retained (Act CXXXIX of 2013). In ad-
dition to the central bank’s traditional duties, the new regulation tackles the scope 
and opportunities of efficient macro-economic duties and interventions, the related 
international cooperation and the supervision of the financial intermediary system. 
The low inflationary level, which was made the primary objective of the central 
bank two decades ago, was considered as an indirect stimulus of economic growth. 
However, nowadays this correlation is questioned by economists. The central bank 
of the US, for example, has been working, since the 1970s, to achieve three goals 
and maintaining inflation at a low level is only one (and not the primary) objective, 
next to boosting growth and employment. In the monetary policy priority order set 
up by FED, the acceleration of growth and increasing employment have been given 
even more emphasis since the 2007 crisis. In order to mitigate the crisis, FED started 
extensive quantitative easing programmes. As a result, by the autumn of 2014, the US 
economy had recovered from the crisis, and so FED stopped quantitative easing. 
From September 2012, the European Central Bank decided to refinance the gov-
ernment securities of the weakly performing Member States falling within the mon-
etary union.12 The Bank of Japan is also performing massive quantitative easing to 
boost the economy. The Funding for Lending Scheme launched by the Bank of Eng-
land was also aimed at boosting the economy. The Bank of Argentina has been setting 
multiple central banking targets since March 2012, its objectives include ensuring 
monetary and financial stability, job creation, an economic development that creates 
equilibrium between incomes, and to a limited extent, the use of foreign currency 
reserves for financing sovereign debt.
From the spring of 2013, the underlying conditions were created for decision-
making in the new type of central banking policy that followed the new world eco-
nomic trends.13 In other words, the bigoted, normative, one-sided system of central 
banks’ primary target regime focusing merely on inflation did not survive the crisis in 
Hungary either. The Funding for Growth Scheme launched by the National Bank of 
Hungary in the summer of 2013 is a significant element in achieving a breakthrough 
in growth. To this end, HUF 750 billion was made available in the form of credit limit 
in the first phase (in 2013) and HUF 2000 billion in the second phase (2014).14 The 
FfG Scheme is the organic continuation of the reliability and grading applied by the 
National Bank of Hungary in the course of cutting the refinancing base rate. As devel-
opments favourable for the scheme, by early 2013 price stability has been established 
and financial stability had also improved a lot in Hungary. From 2014 on, the country 
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was in the position to achieve permanent growth, and so the National Bank can con-
tribute to the breakthrough in growth. 
– By the implementation of the Funding for Growth Scheme, the National Bank 
of Hungary is actually regaining the refinancing functions it used to have in the early 
1990s and had been terminated by the 1990s in respect of the real sector and by the 
turn of the millennium in respect of sovereign debt financing during preparation for 
accession to the European Union.
– The central bank base rate was cut to 3.8; 3.2; 2.1; 1.05 and 0.9 per cent on 28 
August 2013, 27 November 2013, 23 July 2014, 27 April 2016 and 25 May 2016, respec-
tively, as against 7 per cent recorded on 21 December 2011.15 
– In February 2013, the expected total annual inflation was estimated at 2.8 per 
cent.  Since 2014, inflation has been around zero. Inflation was at this low level for the 
last time before 1970. 
In order to facilitate the activity of the National Bank of Hungary to strengthen 
monetary stability, with effect from 1 October 2013, the legislator merged the Hun-
garian Financial Supervision and its powers into the central bank.16 Thus micro-pru-
dential regulation, influence and the underlying control facilities were added to the 
central bank’s macro-prudential regulation, adjusted to the international and Europe-
an Union trends. In September 2013, European Parliament included the 150 largest 
banks of the European Union under the European Central Bank’s control. Since the 
crisis that erupted in 2007, fundamental changes have taken place in the approach to 
public finance, which were followed suit in Hungary after 2010. 
In addition to the refinancing base rate, which had a beneficial impact on sov-
ereign debt financing and commercial lending rates, and the Funding for Growth 
Scheme, the central bank’s Self-Financing Programme17 facilitating the financing of 
sovereign debt also had a significant role in cutting the sovereign debt, which had 
represented nearly 10 per cent to GDP, between 2010 and 2017, and in the consider-
able reduction, approximately halving, of foreign currency denomination. By 2013, 
the Hungarian economy had been over the fiscal policy refashioning,18 and between 
2013 and 2016, the monetary policy regime was also successfully changed. However, in 
order to achieve a breakthrough in competitiveness, further efforts need to be made 
in both fiscal and monetary policies.19 
The government’s role – In a historical  
and scientific perspective
Due to its interdisciplinary nature, public finance as a scientific discipline includes 
politics the economy, using the legal instruments at its disposal, legitimizes an existing 
order and operates it in practice. Although the operation of a state may be compared 
to that of a joint stock company, primary profit interests may hardly be assigned pri-
ority in the organization of public services. The management type state operation 
manifest in the DMP20 paradigm was ultimately born in a neoliberal economic system. 
In a mechanism that proclaimed and enabled unlimited automatisms for market par-
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ticipants. The state did not influence, control or sufficiently regulate the operation 
of “joint stock companies”21, and so without control, the company limited by shares 
functioning as the fundamental unit of the neoliberal production method failed.22 
The transposition of the organizational and operational principles of this insufficient-
ly regulated corporate form and their application to the operation of the state and 
public administration and public services was thus ab ovo doomed to fail. The unregu-
lated joint stock company, the bank – as a system-specific element – proved a fiasco as 
a result of the operation of the non-regulating state. Corporate-level lack of regula-
tion also deprived the regulator with a substantive right, i.e. the state, of regulation to 
a major extent. The minimum control and regulation of market participants and the 
corporate profiteering that arises in such a situation and the accumulation of infor-
mational asymmetries led to a crisis. By 1929–33 it had grown to an overproduction 
crisis, and by 2007–2008 an overlending crisis. The latter was manifest on the level 
of both the state and the population. Public administration and the public service 
system, improperly pushed towards enforcing market principles, the state struggling 
with system function disturbances and the unregulated market units all sank into a 
crisis. 
András Tamás (2013) writes that every Liberalist effort made, using all kinds of ar-
gumentation, at restricting the opportunity of state action in the creation of the state’s 
own economic policy, financial or social system insists on the legal regulation enabling 
market globalization, on the deregulation of the law in force, on forcing global money 
market conditions in the public sector and on a completely new “legal” grounding. 
They insist on public administration that is mainly management, its acceptability is 
marketing and its truth is usefulness and profitability (for someone). 
During the crisis the identification of those accountable for the problems was fre-
quently demanded. The political situation was frequently criticized for too lenient 
rules created according to economic lobbies. Although in the USA extremely strict 
rules were introduced in 2002 (SOX), strict rules alone are incapable of guaranteeing 
long-term reliable economic operation. This is because close and efficient compli-
ance with the rules is indispensable (Kecskés–Halász, 2013:216).
In a public administrative context, the DPM paradigm is the economic constituent 
of the New Public Management, a concept that has become outdated by now, as the 
active state has a strong supervisory and regulatory effect on the operation of public 
services and public utility companies. Thus after 2010, the government regulated the 
service charges of public utility companies that were privatized for the most part in 
the 1990s in Hungary. Then in numerous cases the state repurchased the companies. 
Thus, in respect of companies providing public services, centralization, nationaliza-
tion23 and, through them, the increased service of public good is a requirement and 
an operating principle. This is ensured by close government control and, in many 
cases, national ownership. The new theoretical model that replaces the DPM para-
digm is CNPG24.
Regarding Hungarian history, Lajos Lőrincz concludes that (Lőrincz, 2010a:39–
45) whenever royal power strengthened and/or a powerful government was in office, 
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the country’s security, international relations and economic position became accept-
able, chaos, economic crises an isolation, on the other hand, resulted from languish-
ing governments.
The choice between a strong and active versus weak and nodding governance is a 
long-standing conundrum. To quote academician Antal Mátyás (2007), Neo-Keynesian 
economists (representing a neoclassical synthesis) have a lopsided position on the 
operation of the automatisms of the capitalist economy. In the short term, they dis-
pute the stability of the capitalist private sector. According to Tobin and his co-author, 
Buitner, labour and capital underemployment is sufficiently frequent and permanent 
to justify objection to economic policy intervention (Tobin–Buitner, 1982:183). Mod-
igliani takes a similar position: monetarists are wrong when they believe that the econ-
omy is protected against shocks to the extent that stabilization policies are no longer 
needed. With knowledge of data from the Unites States and other industrial coun-
tries, their claim that stabilization policies have not reduced, but rather increased 
problems is incorrect (Modigliani, 1988:126). The fact that the neoliberal method of 
production collapsed in the spring of 2007 and has not revived is a powerful witness 
to the highlights and references made by Antal Mátyás. According to András Kecskés, 
the laziness that is content with the momentary management of problems and market 
recovery is discernible in the process of the financial crisis that started in 2007 and 
went global by 2008. At the same time, for the purpose of long-term solutions, the 
strength required for altering the theoretical bases was insufficient. Even the crisis 
was insufficient to break the false liberal concept of self-regulation, based on a purely 
market approach, and the necessity of government intervention and involvement was 
mentioned only to the extent required for a fast aid to financial institutions (Kecskés, 
2011:387, 363).
The world order organized on the basis of neoliberal principles and the neoliberal 
method of production built on the Washington Consensus sank into a crisis. For its 
mitigation, both in the United States and in Hungary active government and central 
bank policies came into the foreground, and so the economy regulating role of the 
“state” appreciated, while due to its assistance to fiscal policy, monetary policy (placed 
in a macro-economic perspective) was integrated in the institutional system of public 
finances. Monetary policy does not concentrate public funds (it is not a tax collecting 
authority), and yet, with the appreciation of its support to economic policy and with 
the outdating of its limited, anti-inflationary central banking role in the continental 
European area, especially in Hungary, it was assigned a new role. Increase in the im-
portance of government instruments, in the complexity of central banking activity 
and its integration in the public finance system, in other words, the “state’s” taking an 
active stance also increased the significance of statecraft, and more specifically public 
finance policy. 
Statecraft is a multidisciplinary concept, as it includes all the disciplines dealing 
with the essence, organizational structure and operation of the state. In this perspec-
tive, special significance is assigned to the science of administration, law, economics, 
politics, sociology and history. Modern state studies are a combination of the afore-
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mentioned disciplines, focusing on state operation and aimed at the analysis of effi-
cient state operation at the cross section of the economy, law and society.25 And its ana-
lytical methodology can only be implemented using a combination of economic, legal 
and other social sciences. The governmental and central banking instruments applied 
to overcome the crises caused by the market participants’ unlimited, uncoordinated 
and less state-controlled operation (between 1929 and 1933 and after 2007–2008) 
increase the significance of intervention, and as a concomitant, the study of the state, 
including public finances. 
Public finance is a category shaped by politics in the general sense, based on politi-
cal principles, while the study of the national budget is a technical framework for the 
procedures concerning public finance and public wealth. Both are organic parts of 
statecraft. Both are organic parts of statecraft. They provide the economic and legal 
organizing principles of and framework for state operation. Using its specific instru-
ments, legislators build rules and record the current practice in rules to facilitate con-
tinuity, efficiency, transparency and controllability.26 As the role of the state appreci-
ated, also in Hungary, a thoroughly grounded scientific methodology was required to 
assist its operation. The theory of the state, or statecraft, an interdisciplinary border-
land of law and economics, comprises public law, public (government) finances, the 
study of the national economy, e-government, the academic specializations of public 
service professions, the organization of public administration, public administration 
management and public service communication.27
Figure 1: Scientific framework for the taxonomy of new type Hungarian public finances  
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The crisis of the neoliberal regime required an increase in the role and signifi-
cance of statecraft. A strong and active state’s public finance relations built on a good 
theoretical grounding and its transparent general government system provide the 
basis of sound state operation. Within the theory of the state, the study of public fi-
nances is an academic field that comprises various disciplines that have been expand-
ing as a result of the crisis. 
The banking mechanisms, institutions, and regulatory and supervisory structures, 
included in the category of banking, i.e. the parts traditionally falling within the fun-
damental discipline of finance are close to the domain of state studies. This is because 
without government and international involvement, cross-border regulation, efficient 
supervisory control, occasional budgetary support and influence, private banking is 
incapable of operating as a going concern. 
From another perspective, the state is given a new role in crisis management: in or-
der to stabilize conditions in the wake of a crisis that has evolved and escalated, it is a 
reasonable expectation that a strong market regulatory and controlling power should 
focus its efforts on the financial markets and the banking institutions. The coordina-
tion, influencing and controls of business organizations can only be successful in the 
framework of a well-organized economic governance, i.e. according to clear public 
finance and transparent budgetary sub-systems. 
The successes that have been following one after the other in the Hungarian na-
tional economy since 2010,28 the developments seen in the international arena since 
2007 and the periods that can be characterized by successes in Hungarian history are 
always based on a proactive role undertaken by the state. Therefore the criticisms of 
the changes that have taken place in Hungary are correct in this context, and may not 
be directed at the manner of public finance administration, as the latter is adjusted to 
the international environment according to a logic that organically connects to and 
is built on the historical past while also meeting the current social demand.29 Most of 
the criticisms may only relate to the speed of changes.30 Nevertheless, it is a fact that 
the neoliberal market economy took the deepest roots in Hungary from among the 
countries of the post-Soviet area. Hungary saw the fastest setting up of an operating 
mechanism for a raw neoliberal market economy and a deregulated state not match-
ing the economic and social endowments.31 Any change, or in other word, recovery 
from the crisis is only possible if a nearly organic condition is created, i.e. if the unfit-
ting, inorganic elements are abandoned as soon as possible.32 This procedure started 
in 2010 with the creation of the management model built on burden sharing33 and 
governmental economy engineering, which was then reinforced in 2013 by massive 
central bank support to make Hungary one of the fastest-growing countries that could 
simultaneously maintain financial stability.34
Conclusions and summary of the Hungarian model
Fiscal consolidation, which included setting things straight in the central budget and 
at local councils, and then with the involvement of the central bank, corrected things 
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for families and businesses indebted in foreign currency, managed to create stable 
financial and political conditions suitable for governance. Fiscal policy focuses on 
the expansion of solvent demand, primarily through income regulation. Widening 
the scope of taxpayers (international businesses, banks), adjusting taxes to tax pay-
ment capacity, and the moderation of the tax burdens of residents are simultaneously 
present in fiscal policy. Tax cuts for domestic participants (personal and corporate 
income taxes), a broad family benefit system and governmental economy engineer-
ing (use of government instruments to help market acquisition, economic policy of 
opening to the East and to the South) increase liquidity, revenues and capitalization, 
which, in turn, improve the national economy’s value creation capacity. Ensuring the 
permanent relocation of foreign companies in Hungary (through the conclusion of 
strategic agreements) serves the balancing of economic growth. The government 
regulation of public utility service prices, and the repurchase of public utility service 
providers into national ownership show heavily etatist features. The monetary policy 
means used after 2013 for bridging the gaps created by the crisis also follow the trend, 
are hyperactive and serve the public good in the broad sense of the word.35 
In a recovery from the crisis, increased government influence is justified. This 
can be evidenced by examples from the international arena and from the previous 
periods of the Hungarian economy (see the historical retrospection). The speed of 
changes in Hungary after 2010 is conspicuous, and this is explained – in a mental 
attitude arising from historical disadvantages – by the several centuries-long lack of 
independent national governance, a long series of unsuccessful economic reforms, 
wars of independence and efforts at secession and liberty, which are followed by in-
creased demand for success. Success entails the improvement of the country’s eco-
nomic potential, which in turn leads to higher living standards and a stronger voice 
in foreign policy. In other words, the depth and speed of changes seen in Hungary 
in the past few years are driven by centuries-long failures and the resulting demand 
for rise and strengthening. An analysis of more recent periods reveals that the failure 
of the change of regime in Hungary (between the 1980s and 2010) and the negative 
developments feeding through to Hungary from the global crisis can only be offset by 
a quick transformation of the economic method and the educational approach to a 
methodology that differs from the previous one (Zéman, 2016:202–207). The quick-
est possible way to achieve results is to push the previous models that caused failure to 
the background. The fact that society supports these efforts – through the electorate’s 
permanent political mandate – is a concomitant of the Hungarian model. Neither 
the Soviet-type planned economy built on excessive public centralization, planned 
economy, exclusive state ownership, nor the neoliberal market economy model that 
replaced it and was applied in deviation from the Hungarian requirements and pe-
culiar features are viable in Hungary for the future. However, a model that exercises 
government influence reasonably and supports the operation of the various market 
participants and households holds out the promise of success. Simultaneously, we find 
economic growth, inflation at a historic low, budget equilibrium, and surplus in the 
balance of payments and the foreign trade balance. 
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Notes
1  This study was written in the Wekerle Sándor Scientific Workshop of Public Finances. National Univer-
sity of Public Service, Institute of Public Finance, Budapest. 
2  This had not been characteristic of FED even before the crisis, as it always had multiple monetary objec-
tives and the struggle against inflation did not take precedence over other goals. After 2008, unemploy-
ment rose and boosting economic growth were given higher emphasis in the US central banking policy. 
3  Including the European Central Bank, and the National Bank of Hungary after 2013. In terms of monetary 
objectives and instruments, FED has “never” had a single objective supported by assigned instruments. 
4  See the list of the most important books and articles – published on this topic and worked out in con-
servative economic workshops – at the end of this study, well justified by the methodological pluralism 
following the crisis. See Csaba, 2013.
5  In the opinion of the author as a researcher. The monetary institution is not an organization meant to 
centralize public funds (it does not collect taxes and is not included in public finances), but it is part of 
public finances and an institution that supports fiscal policy while retaining its independence. Without 
interfering with its independence, it supports the government’s anti-crisis policy, and thus its activity 
performed in the interest of public good has a more complex dimension than a mere focus on the 
moderation of inflation.
6  For more details, see Kolozsi–Lentner, 2006:39–41.
7  The termination of longer-term, preferential lending to SMEs based on the central bank’s base rate 
weakened their competitive positions and even their survival chances. Financing the total government 
debt from the free market resulted in an increase in interest costs and unreliability due to external 
financing.
8  With the central bank’s contribution, as for example, in the case of families having foreign currency 
loans.
9  For a description of the public finance system during the change of regime, see Lentner, Csaba: Main 
Propositions of the Methological Part (Chapter I) in Lentner, 2013a:518–526. and Lentner, 2014b. For 
more details on the comprehensive taxonomy of consolidation, see Lentner, 2015c:447–461. 
10  For more details, see Lentner, 2015b:297–311.
11  On the level of households, for example, by making part of the central bank’s reserves (nearly EUR 10 
billion) available for the conversion of foreign currency loans of families to forint loans. Replacement 
of the loans of businesses indebted in foreign currency with forint loans in the framework of Funding 
for Growth tier 2, and reducing government debt and the interest on commercial loans by cutting the 
refinancing base rate.
12  Actual actions were only taken in 2015 and later. For more details, see Lentner, 2015e.
13  A new management was appointed at the head of the central bank, and in addition to the standards pre-
vailing during the previous decades, they also promote economic development and financial stability.  
14  USD 1 is worth approximately HUF 287.66 at the MNB’s rate on 6 February 2017. 
15  The central bank’s base rate cut started after the 2010 general elections and expressly from the date the 
new government delegated members to the Monetary Council. 
16  For further details see Kálmán, 2015:125–138.
17  For further details see Kolozsi, 2015:290–305.
18  Hungary was released from the EU’s excessive deficit procedure, and since then its budget deficit has 
been permanently below 3 per cent. 
19  In fiscal terms, in order to “favour” domestic businesses on a wider scale, and in the case of the central 
bank, promote market-based lending after the phasing-out of the Funding for Growth Scheme, re-
duce lending risks and provide an impetus to economic growth through lending to SMEs, the National 
Bank of Hungary launched the Growth Support Scheme to assist banks in transition to market lending. 
The Growth Support Scheme comprises the phasing off stage of the Funding for Growth Scheme and 
the Market Lending Scheme. The direct support mechanisms of the Hungarian public finance system 
should be replaced by indirect instruments, and the “reinforced” economic participants – indirectly 
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supported by the public finance system – should be able to meet the challenges among market condi-
tions. Compare the period after the Quantitative Easing (QE) in FED’s case. 
20  Decentralization, privatization and management are the elements of the outdated New Public Manage-
ment.   
21  In other words: the operation of banks and businesses. 
22  US sub-prime mortgage market crisis, and the mass bankruptcy of banks, production and service provid-
ing companies. The lack of market coordination and efficient control. Greed, rapacity and the subordi-
nation of corporate operation to considerations related to profit on the markets left without regulation. 
See Bánfi–Kürthy–Bánfi, 2011:191–210.
23  By analogy of the French etatist state model.
24  The author’s definition: Centralization, Nationalization, Public Good. 
25  This only applies to those parts of the mentioned fields that tackle state operation, fiscal, monetary and 
control procedures. To mention an incorrect example: world economy or micro-economy transferred 
from business sciences as curricular items are not part of state studies, unless they focus on state opera-
tion and the related effects. 
26  This may be performed through motions made by representatives or government submissions, which 
may then become statutes. Or it may be coded on chiselled diorite monoliths (Hammurabi), but the 
essence is the same. They are technical instruments in the operation of the state machinery. The eco-
nomic dimension of taxation is a technical instrument, as taxpayers basically pay taxes according to 
the fiscal requirements set by public finances rather than their economically optimum tax payment 
capacities. The incumbent political force and its intent and values are the ultimate power that shapes 
public finances. Thus this is no organic bottom-to-top procedure, just as “political society is in no way an 
outcome of a contract between individuals making efforts at association. There has always been a social 
order from the very beginning...” (Abélés, 1990). This means that things are predetermined. Law and 
economic management track, arrange the order into rules, and execute. 
27  This list does not endeavour to be exhaustive, but gives an overview of the new kind of thinking.
28  Similarly to the prevention of a state bankruptcy, create financial stabilization, and then restarting eco-
nomic growth, increasing employment and solvent demand, cutting sovereign debt, economy manage-
ment without IMF loans etc. 
29  In other words, they are implemented in adjustment to the country’s economic and social past and 
present demand, while also following international examples. 
30  This is my subjective position.
31  Hungary was kept above the water by loans granted from IMF, the WB and the ECB in the amount of 
USD 25 billion. Between 2008 and 2010, essentially “the crisis stagnated”.
32  I have never considered the complete in-depth introduction, without any transition, of the neoliberal 
market economy of the Anglo-Saxon type, or at least the one that evolved there, and experimenting with 
it for two decades, adjustable to the Hungarian environment that wished to change regime at the end 
of the 1980s (a collapsed Soviet-type planned economy in a country previously chopped to one-third of 
its territory after centuries of Habsburg influence and despotic or subordinated public finances, and no 
longer than only a one thousand and one hundred years of presence in the Carpathian Basin in a public 
administrative space of the Western model preceded by thousands of years of presence in Asia, all these 
traceable in recollections and in genetics). 
33  In a simple language “burden sharing” is the levying of taxes on international companies and banks 
according to their financial capabilities.
34  Growth and simultaneous (financial and price) stability may provide good basis for the permanent sus-
tenance of the model that has been built, especially if the social attitude (legitimation – Rodrik’s model) 
remains supportive.
35  The central bank’s corporate responsibility has also changed, and has been expanded. In a broad sense 
it can be said that it serves public benefit using the monetary instruments at its disposal, its loans for 
growth and its self-financing scheme. In this topic, see our studies on commercial and central banking 
CSR: Lentner–Szegedi–Tatay, 2015a:95–103. and Lentner–Szegedi–Tatay, 2015b:35–47. 
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